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1 Introduction 
 
‘Let’s remember that safety and concern for people must always be the top priority’.1 
 
1.1 Topic and background 
The topic of this thesis is to describe the existing safety regime in offshore 
installations in two major oil and gas producing countries, mainly in Norway and 
secondarily in the UK. Furthermore, the proposal of the upcoming European Regulation on 
‘safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities’ will be 
discussed and evaluated. 
 
Norway and UK are undoubtedly leading players in the field of oil and gas, not only 
in Europe but also globally. Their presence in the business started decades ago, with 
Norway celebrating 40 years as an oil-producing nation in 2011
2
. Therefore they have both 
gained great experience in terms of exploring, planning and development of the offshore 
installations. 
 
A crucial aspect of these offshore operations is that all that are engaged in them must 
always take safety into account. The exploration and production of oil and gas is by itself a 
dangerous activity, since these substances are easily flammable and contain dangers of 
explosion. If we further put in the picture the geographical area in which these activities 
are being conducted, in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea under harsh 
weather conditions and far from the coast, it is evident how much importance should be put 
on the protection of health, safety and environment (HSE). The protection of human life 
comes always first in every kind of industrial operation and this can be guaranteed only by 
securing a high safety level. 
 
                                                 
1
 Magne Ognedal, director general of the Petroleum Safety Authority in ‘Safety status & signals 2011-2012’. 
2
 The first oil discovery on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) took place in 1969 (field of Ekofisk) and 
the production of oil begun in June 1971. 
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Given the strong presence in oil and gas production of Norway and UK over the 
years, together with economic and political stability, it comes as no surprise that both 
countries have developed an efficient safety regime. Of course accidents do happen but 
their safety regime is considered to be one of the best internationally, with other equally 
significant oil-producing countries asking Norway for information and guidance in order to 
improve their safety level (USA after the Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010).  
 
Safety in this kind of operations contains a variety of parameters. Use of 
technologically advanced equipment and materials on the installations, well-educated and 
trained staff, a high level of communications off- and onshore are only some of the basic 
aspects that contribute to safety. In this thesis attention is primarily given to the very 
special -and in some aspects unique- Norwegian offshore safety system. Reference will be 
given to the British one as well, since it is considered more complete to see the safety 
frame under both successful regimes. 
 
On the other hand, safety in petroleum activities is not only seen as a local challenge, 
but it is rather gaining wide attention. Namely, the European Commission intends to create 
a unified European safety system for offshore oil and gas activities to enable an increased 
safety in offshore operations and prevent fatal accidents from happening.
3
 Especially after 
the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the Commission thought it was urgent to create 
a legal framework that will eliminate the risk of a similar accident to take place in Europe 
with disastrous consequences for people and the environment.  
 
As good and logical as the intentions of Europe may be, this upcoming European 
Regulation (or Directive – this has not yet been clarified) has created lots of discussions 
among the parties involved. Both Norway and UK strongly oppose the implementation of 
this Regulation and this is another reason why both countries are being referred to in this 
thesis.  
 
                                                 
3
 ‘Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, 
exploration and production activities’, draft of October 2011, COM (2011) 688. 
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In order to understand the intended European framework, the main points of the 
Regulation and the possible changes to the existing regimes will be evaluated. 
Furthermore, a critical discussion will take place about the advantages and disadvantages 
of such an attempt, as well as the reasons why the two leading countries in offshore safety 
(especially Norway) oppose it. 
 
Needless to say, the European Union wants to ensure a minimum level of safety of 
offshore petroleum operations in all European territory. The protection of human life, 
health of personnel and of the environment are top priorities and must be guaranteed 
through law. The question is whether such a project is achievable and how a successful 
safety regime of the North Sea can be applied in the whole of Europe with all the different 
circumstances that are observed. 
 
1.2 The outline of the thesis 
In order to facilitate the examination of this topic, the thesis is divided into two parts. 
In the first one the Norwegian and the British offshore safety system are described, 
whereas in the second one there is the description and evaluation of the proposed European 
Regulation. 
 
In more detail, chapter 2 contains the legal framework of the Norwegian safety 
regime with the necessary Regulations, Statutes and Decrees. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses in detail the Norwegian offshore safety regime, its development 
and organization as well as the interlinked roles of both the State and the industry. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the British offshore safety system, its development after a major 
accident and its differences from the Norwegian. 
 
Chapter 5 contains a presentation of the proposal of the upcoming European 
Regulation, explaining the reasons for its planning and the intended goal. 
 
Chapter 6 provides a description of the arguments of Norway and UK towards the 
Proposal: Why do Norway and UK oppose its implementation? Furthermore, in chapter 7 
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there is a critical discussion about this European legislation: are there any problems that it 
may cause? What challenges will the Union face in the future related to safety in offshore 
oil and gas activities? 
Finally, the main points of the thesis will be summarized with an emphasis on the general 
establishment of a high-standard safety regime in the European Union area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
  
2 Legal sources 
 
2.1   Statutes, Decrees, additional Regulations 
In Norway, the offshore safety regulations are found in the Laws, Royal Decrees 
and Regulations. Since the petroleum activities contain a variety of elements, e.g. health of 
personnel, working conditions, environmental issues and safety of installations, it is normal 
to have different pieces of legislation for each aspect. In other words, there is not only one 
Law that regulates offshore safety generally. 
 
 In this respect, for the first part of the thesis as described above, there are three 
statutes that deal with offshore safety and cover all aspects of it: i) the Petroleum Act 1996 
(PA), ii) the Working Environment Act 2005 and iii) the Pollution Control Act 1981. 
 
More specifically, the Petroleum Act regulates the offshore petroleum activities 
carried out on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). It also contains a chapter on 
general safety requirements. 
 
The Working Environment Act regulates aspects about the protection of jobs and 
the working conditions onshore. Therefore it does not apply directly to safety and it will 
not be analyzed further for the purposes of this specific thesis, but it should be taken into 
account in order to complete the safety framework.  
 
Lastly, since the engagement in petroleum activities entails by itself a risk of 
damaging the environment, the Pollution Control Act is also relevant, found in iii) 
although it will not be described in detail. 
 
All the above are formal Acts that regulate petroleum activities in general, but 
contain few provisions about specifically safety. For this purpose, the Acts give the power 
to the King to further regulate all the necessary details on specific matters through the 
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issuance of Royal Decrees. Pursuant to the Decrees, further Regulations are issued which 
are also applicable. 
 
In this respect, the most important and basic piece of legislation is the Royal 
Decree of 12 February 2010 which formed the Regulations relating to health, safety and 
the environment in the petroleum activities and at certain onshore facilities (the 
Framework Regulations).
4
 These Regulations give the basic rules in offshore petroleum 
activities. Pursuant to them, there are four supplementary Regulations relating to 
Management, Facilities, Activities and Technical & Operational matters
5
 that complete the 
picture of safety. 
 
Finally, I also consider the Guidelines of these five Regulations to be very 
important, especially the Guidelines from the Framework Regulations. Although they are 
not legally binding, they provide a better understanding of the safety requirements and 
their purpose, making it clearer what these Regulations aim to achieve. 
 
A brief reference to the British offshore safety Acts will also be given. 
 
As far as the second part of the thesis is concerned, the basic legal source is the 
European Regulation itself. 
 
2.2   Legal literature 
The legal literature cannot be regarded as legal source stricto sensu, however it 
provides useful information about the advantages of the relevant safety systems, their 
historical development and the needs for the future. Therefore, in this thesis, the literature 
(Norwegian and British) plays a role in the first part where the highly qualified safety 
regimes of Norway and UK are discussed. 
                                                 
4
 The 2010 Framework Regulations carry on and combine the content of the following: the 2001 regulations 
relating to health, safety and the environment in the petroleum activities and the 2003 temporary regulations 
relating to safety and working environment for certain land facilities and associated pipe line systems. 
5
 The Framework and management regulations are applicable both offshore and onshore and they should be 
read jointly. The regulations for technical and operational matters apply only to certain onshore facilities. 
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 Since the European Regulation has not yet come into force, there is no helpful 
additional literature on this matter. 
Relevant literature will be cited when necessary. 
 
2.3  Articles, non-papers 
For the critical discussion about the proposal of the European Regulation, relevant 
articles in the British and in the Norwegian press as well as in the European Commission’s 
press center have proved very useful. Through them it was possible to better understand 
the reasons behind this coming legislation, the different implicated arguments and 
consequently form a view on the matter. In addition, the non-papers containing the position 
of the Norwegian State presented to the Commission were taken into account. 
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3 The Norwegian offshore safety system 
 
3.1 General approach 
Since the beginning of the petroleum exploration and production on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf in 1965, the need for safe operations had been pointed out, both from the 
industry and the State authorities. In an industry like this, the protection of people and the 
environment always stays in the forefront. Continuously improving the level of safety in 
offshore petroleum operations aims to avoid accidents from happening, which would cause 
significant harm to health, environment and installations.  
 
As a starting point, the use of advanced technological materials on the offshore and 
onshore installations plays a very important role in safety: the more recent technological 
developments are used, the higher levels of safety are supposed to ensure. For this reason, 
the safety regulations oblige operators/licensees to continuously upgrade their equipment 
standards, often following the advice of experienced scientists. They have to keep up-to-
date with the latest developments and incorporate them into the industry. 
 
In addition, the importance of building safety at the early stages of the activities 
(starting in the exploration phase) with early assessments and decisions has been pointed 
out by several experts. In this way safety will be more possible to achieve and more cost-
efficient for the industry as well. Based on safety analyses that are required to be 
conducted about the different risks that may arise, major design changes and extra costs 
will be avoided. 
 
However, the use of state-of-the-art technology is not by itself enough to eliminate 
the possibilities of accidents in offshore petroleum activities. Since the industry is 
organized in a rather complicated way, with many and different people and companies 
involved, other important factors should also be taken into consideration. It goes without 
saying that this sensitive business requires adequate training of personnel, a variety of ‘ad 
hoc’ decisions and a high level of attention among all departments involved. 
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For all the above reasons, it is evident that a set of political, organizational, economic 
and even psychological aspects intervene and determine the safety in offshore activities. 
All these should be taken into account when trying to reduce the possibility of an accident 
to happen. Of course the most important factor is legislation, which sets the goals that have 
to be achieved together with the appropriate means. Law also provides the competent 
Authorities with the power to enforce the requirements, in case they are not properly 
applied by the parties. Therefore the Framework Regulations that will be discussed below 
form the legal tool which outlines the goals, appoints responsibility and describes the 
enforcement measures to ensure offshore safety in petroleum activities. 
 
The Norwegian offshore safety regime comprises different sets of rules which all 
intend to contribute to a higher safety level. Norway has established an efficient safety 
regime based on goal-setting rules and the performance of safety control by the industry 
through internal control systems, with the safety authorities monitoring the safety 
performance of the industry. The development of safety regulations and the performance of 
safety management will be further analyzed below. 
 
3.1.1 Development of the offshore safety regulations in Norway 
Norway has given importance to safety in offshore activities from the very 
beginning. However, it is normal that during these 40 years of oil and gas exploration and 
production the regulatory regime has evolved, giving way to more efficient practices.  
  
In the beginning there was a set of rules which laid out very distinctive 
requirements aiming to make the industry follow them in an exact way.
6
 The logic behind 
was that if the safety measures were clearly stated in the Acts, then the possibility to ensure 
a satisfactory safety level would be higher. The subsequent Decrees in the following years 
continued this path by laying down ‘do’s and don’ts’ that the responsible party was obliged 
to follow.
7
  
                                                 
6
 Royal Decree of 1967 on safety in exploring and drilling for sub-sea petroleum deposits. 
7
 Royal Decrees of 1972 on framework for offshore operations, of 1975 on how the licensee should carry out 
his activities, of 1976 on safe practices for the production of submarine resources and of 1977 on working 
environment in offshore petroleum exploration and production. 
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In 1977 however, there was a blow out accident and in 1980 the Alexander 
Kielland platform capsized, causing the death of 123 people. It then became clear that a 
more efficient safety regime should be established. In 1985 the whole philosophy of safety 
regulation was changed and goal-setting requirements were substituted for the descriptive 
ones. A more substantial approach was needed in order to make the industry responsible 
for the safety in offshore petroleum activities. Therefore, the internal control system was 
introduced: it was not anymore sufficient for the industry to follow the straightforward 
requirements laid out by the regulations or the authorities. With the new system the 
operator and the licensee shall ‘see to it’8 that all facilities and activities fulfill the 
applicable safety requirements. By that expression, it is clarified that the operator has the 
overall responsibility to see to it that all applicable safety offshore rules are complied with. 
Taking this further, the term ‘see to it’ entails a duty imposed on licensees, employees, 
owners, contractors and sub-contractors to create a safety management  through which it 
will be possible to ensure that all parties comply with the safety requirements.
9
 
 
  In other words, nowadays the industry has to identify by itself what needs to be 
done to ensure the necessary safety level and internally apply any possible corrections. 
This approach entails that every actor has the responsibility to enforce compliance with the 
safety rules. Individual responsibility gains in this way much more weight than it used to. 
So it can be said that there have been two main directions in the development of 
Norwegian law: the regulation of the activities in general and the development of the 
internal control system. 
 
Another important characteristic of the Norwegian offshore safety legislation is the 
establishment of goal-setting rules. Established specifically in section 9-1 of the Petroleum 
Act, this requirement reads as follows: ‘The petroleum activities shall be conducted in such 
manner as to enable a high level of safety to be maintained and further developed in 
accordance with the technological development’. It is clear that the requirement according 
                                                 
8
 In the text of the Framework Regulations: ‘påse’, meaning the obligation of the licensee to ensure 
compliance with the safety regulations. This term has been used in this form in section 10-6 of the Petroleum 
Act and then in the Framework Regulations in section 7. The translation in English ‘see to it’ has dominated. 
9
 This is the follow-up duty; see below 3.3.1 the description about internal control system. 
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to this section is to operate the petroleum activities in a well-planned way, taking their 
hazardous character into consideration in addition to other factors as environment and 
safety of personnel
10
. No specific solutions are provided by law– on the contrary the 
authorities publish functional requirements that show the desired results, while the operator 
and licensees must find the solutions. 
 
This system is followed also by the Framework Regulations as will be analyzed 
below.
11
 According to them, the operator has the overall responsibility to see to it that all 
relevant parties work to obtain the safety level desired. The operator is particularly obliged 
to continuously improve the safety level of his petroleum operations. The Acts and 
regulations do not lay down explicit details on what has to be followed; they rather put 
down a set of goals that have to be achieved in order to ensure the desired level of safety. 
Of course, in order to facilitate the implementation process, some guidelines and general 
recommendations are given by the authorities. However, they are not legally binding or 
mandatory; they are outlines trying to help the responsible parties to better fulfill their 
obligations. 
 
      Summing up, it is clear that the development of the Norwegian offshore safety rules 
has been adapted to the needs of the industry after consideration of the way that the highest 
possible safety level can be ensured. The combination of general, goal setting rules and 
individual decisions in special circumstances, increase the possibility to obtain a high 
safety level. Therefore, the goal-setting system provided the parties with the opportunity to 
take on the responsibility to choose by themselves the appropriate methods. So a 
characteristic feature of this safety development that will help understand the following 
analysis is the move from detailed requirements to more general functional standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Section 10-1 of Petroleum Act, second subsection. 
11
 Section 10 of the Framework Regulations. 
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3.2 Safety management system in Norway 
 
3.2.1  Applicable Legislation 
Before proceeding to the examination and analysis of the safety management 
system in Norway, it is considered essential to give the legal frame which determines how 
this system is operating.  
It is evident that since the petroleum activities contain maritime operations as well, 
a combination of Acts will be applicable, regulating both petroleum and maritime matters. 
Of course the Act which is widely applicable on offshore operations is the 1996 Petroleum 
Act, which describes a variety of oil activities and stipulates that ‘the petroleum activities 
shall be conducted in such manner as to enable a high level of safety to be maintained and 
further developed in accordance with the technological development’.12 This constitutes 
the basic and general safety requirement in the petroleum operations in Norway. 
 
Apart from this Act, there are also others which are applicable in some parts of 
such activities. The Working Environment Act of 2005 regulates a variety of working 
conditions such as working hours and how working life shall be protected. It therefore 
applies also to the offshore personnel. In addition to this, the Ship Safety and Security Act 
of 2007 safeguards ‘life, health, property and the environment by facilitating a high level 
of ship safety and safety management [...] ensuring a good working environment and safe 
working conditions on board ships[...]’.13 So this Act is applicable for the personnel which 
rests onboard a ship or in a floating device which usually stands by the oil installations to 
carry out various supporting tasks. 
 
Moreover, as far as protection against pollution is concerned, the Pollution Control 
Act of 1981 applies.
14
 Since petroleum operations are by their nature considered 
potentially polluting activities, this Act specifically aims to set down strict detailed 
requirements in order to protect the environment, as well as sanctions in case of breach. 
                                                 
12
 Section 9-1 of the Petroleum Act from Chapter 9 about Special requirements to safety. 
13
 Section 1 of Ship Safety and Security Act – Purpose of the Act. Emphasis added. 
14
 1981 Act on protection against pollution and on waste. 
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Additionally, the Petroleum Act contains general provisions about extent of liability in 
case of pollution.
15
 
 
The above mentioned Acts constitute a general legal framework which themselves 
contain little guidance as to what safety measures are really required. Therefore, the Acts 
give further power to the King to issue Royal Decrees, setting down in a more detailed 
manner the circumstances, conditions and rules applicable to safety. Pursuant to the 
Decrees regulations are issued which form the greater and more comprehensive picture of 
safety. In this case, there is one important piece of legislation forming the basis of the 
petroleum operations for safety: the 2010 Framework Regulations.
16
 They describe the 
safety management system by pointing out the responsible parties (State and industry) and 
their role in ensuring the desired safety level. The Guidelines of these regulations explain 
each section in more detail, making it easier to interpret the short – sometimes- text of the 
regulations. Additionally, the Framework Regulations make it clear that among a variety of 
relevant Ministries and public bodies, the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has the 
regulatory responsibility for safety, emergency preparedness and the working environment 
in the petroleum activities.
17
 Of course there is a continuous collaboration between the 
PSA and other governmental bodies and organizations in order to better organize the 
activities, but the PSA is supervising all of them.
18
 
 
It is also important to define the scope of application of the Framework 
Regulations. Section 2 defines that they apply on petroleum activities and on some onshore 
facilities which are further described in Section 6.
19
 To be more precise, the Regulations 
                                                 
15
 Chapter 7 of the Petroleum Act – Liability for pollution damage. 
16
 They came into force the 1st January 2011 and repealed all previous management and activities regulations 
trying to coordinate the safety in the best possible way.  
17
 This responsibility was transferred to the PSA from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in 1st January 
2004. 
18
Norwegian Directorate of Health, Ministry of Petroleum & Energy, Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion, 
Industri Energi and other organizations engaged into petroleum industry.  
19
 Letter e (onshore facility), section 6 refers to pipeline systems used for the transportation of gas or 
petroleum in land and are covered by the PA and the Framework regulations. The reason for this is that they 
constitute together with the offshore installations an undivided group and the one cannot exist without the 
other. Therefore it is considered safer to regulate them together.  
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cover safety aspects related to activities which are associated with subsea petroleum 
deposits and include exploration, production and transportation of oil and gas.
20
  
 
The purpose of the Regulations is given in the first section, outlining the three main 
goals: promote high standards for health, safety and the environment when engaged in 
petroleum activities, continuously develop and improve the safety level and finally, 
implement measures to comply with the applicable requirements and achieve the goals laid 
out by them.  
 
If the purpose laid out under letter b) of section 1 is divided into two parts, very 
interesting results can be extracted. Firstly, the ‘systematic implementation of measures’ 
serves as a basis for the establishment of the internal control system for the industry, which 
is an efficient way of managing the safety rules and conditions and it will be analyzed 
below.
21
 Secondly, the phrase ‘achieve the goals laid down in the legislation’ makes clear 
that these regulations do not provide descriptive regulations but they rather aim to have 
certain results fulfilled. In other words, the authorities will exercise overall assessment on 
how the responsible parties (operators/licensees) follow the requirements and they will not 
check step by step if technical specifications are complied with. 
 
As it is explained in the Guidelines regarding the Framework Regulations, in order 
for safety standards to be developed, a different approach from what has been traditionally 
used as legal tool should be implemented: the regulators are not providing ready solutions, 
‘‘do’s and don’ts’’; on the contrary it is considered more efficient to describe what should 
be achieved.
22
 In this way, the involved parties (operators, licensees, personnel, the 
managers onshore) will gain a significant flexibility for their actions in obtaining the safety 
level required. After having assessed their strengths, their financial capabilities and 
competencies they will act respectively. 
 
                                                 
20
 See definition of ‘petroleum activity’ in section 1-6 letter c and 1-4, scope of application. 
21
 See 3.3.1 internal safety control. 
22
 An example: ‘The petroleum activities shall be conducted in such manner as to enable a high level of 
safety [...]’, section 9-1 of PA. 
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 The goal-setting rules promote creativity and mood for further developing the 
established practices. If on the top of this there is a fruitful collaboration with the 
regulatory bodies, then only good results can be expected. This flexibility enforces also the 
sense of responsibility inside the industry: the central actors of a play should take care of 
the working environment and ensure that everyone working for them will stay safe. They 
know consequently that they have to bear the consequences of their acts – either good or 
highly unpleasant. So the goal-setting system provides the industry with a good incentive 
to always improve the safety practices. After the Macondo (Gulf of Mexico) accident it 
also became clear that a high level of safety is very important for the industry as such – as 
a ‘license to operate’. 
 
 
This of course does not mean that detailed norms cannot be found throughout 
Norwegian legislation. These guidelines, however, do not have a legally binding effect on 
the responsible parties, since they can choose other methods than those described in the 
legislation as soon as the desired safety result can be obtained. On the other side, one 
should bear in mind that the responsible party cannot deviate totally from the prescribed 
methods, since these are considered from the authorities to be the best and most suitable 
for safety. If the responsible party nevertheless is able to apply solutions different from the 
ones suggested in the guidelines, then he will have the burden of proof that he used equally 
efficient safety practices.
23
 
 
All these functional requirements can be accused of being too general and therefore 
not so helpful. The responsible parties may face difficulties during the process of 
identifying what actions have to be made in order to achieve the desired safety result. 
Undoubtedly the specific do’s and don’ts are easier to follow.  
 
To sum up, the applicable Framework regulations contain functional requirements 
allowing the industry to choose how it will comply with them. Practically, the industry will 
follow the recommendations laid out by the authorities. But the most important thing about 
                                                 
23
 Section 24 of the Framework Regulations: ‘[...] the responsible party shall be able to document that the 
chosen solution fulfills the regulatory requirements’. 
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these goal-setting regulations is that the responsibility mainly lies in the heart of 
operations: on the operator and the licensee.  
 
 
3.2.2 Exemptions and administrative decisions 
Since the goal-setting rules may create problems of uncertainty or vagueness, the 
authorities exercise their power by monitoring the safety level in the activities through 
verification of the internal control systems of the operator and the licensees, inspections, 
administrative decisions and exemptions under specific circumstances. In this way, the 
general provisions of the regulations are transformed into individual, directly applicable 
practices which have taken into account specific circumstances. 
 
As a starting point, the Petroleum Safety Authority has the authority to supervise 
the management systems established by the responsible party (operator) in order to ensure 
compliance with the rules for health, safety and environment.
24
 Within this supervisory 
discretion falls also the power to grant exemptions to the operator or licensee in case 
special conditions are met. The PSA can decide for example that a kind of reports that 
generally have to be submitted by the operator, may not be submitted for one time by this 
specific company because it had made reports with similar content shortly before. 
 
Another form of this practice can be the acceptance from the authorities to modify 
the requirements so that the operator can comply with them – preserving of course the 
safety standard. As far as the procedure of granting exemptions is concerned, this can be 
done either officially by the State itself or after application from the interested party.
25
 For 
instance, the operator must apply for an exemption if he intends to deviate from a clearly 
specified method in the regulations. Needless to say, the authorities will consider all 
relevant circumstances that have been put to their knowledge and an exemption will apply 
to this specific operator only. 
                                                 
24
 Section 67 of the Framework Regulations. 
25
 The application for exemption should contain a detailed description of the reasons of non-conformity and 
where this desire for exemption is based as well as other justificatory documents – see Guidelines regarding 
the Framework regulations on section 70. 
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Secondly, the individual decisions constitute another way of transforming the 
general requirements into specific ones. They are granted when they are ‘necessary to 
enforce the provisions stipulated in these regulations’.26 Mainly, such decisions will be 
made by the PSA and not by the Ministries and their aim is to enforce the requirements 
stipulated in the provisions. So they are mandatory for the operator to follow but they do 
not create new requirements, only detailing or specifying the regulatory ones. The 
authorities collect the data concerning the specific operator and issue decisions that again, 
are applicable to him only.  
 
As a conclusion, these two legal tools transform the general non-binding guidelines 
into individual practices with the ultimate goal to develop further the safety management 
of the operator. Each licensee operates under different situations (personnel, economic 
assets, experience etc.) and must therefore adapt to them – for that task the authorities are 
called into play ensuring that everyone complies with the regulations. 
 
3.2.3 Safety control and enforcement 
Based upon the description of the regulations applying to the offshore safety 
industry and the individual measures that the State exercises, it is important to examine 
how actually the State checks that the industry complies with the safety requirements. It 
has been clear that the Norwegian safety system is not being restricted to laying down a 
series of safety norms – it has to see actually that the operator conforms to the norms, in 
practice through, inter alia, the development of an internal control system. 
 
It has been mentioned already that the PSA is a supervisory authority and its 
responsibility is to ensure compliance with the safety rules. Theoretically this includes all 
operators, licensees and sub-contractors, but in practice it is impossible to have a 
continuous contact with all of them, with limited personnel of 170 people. Consequently, 
the state safety control primarily takes the form of the supervision: ‘[...] the PSA will carry 
out supervision within its respective area of authority to ensure compliance with the 
requirements [...]’.27 This means that the PSA leaves primarily the responsibility for safety 
                                                 
26
 Section 69 of the Framework Regulations.  
27
 Section 67 of the Framework Regulations – supervisory authority. 
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to the industry and its most important job is to check that the operator is fulfilling his 
responsibility. Supervision includes contact with the involved parties in the forms of 
investigations, applications and meetings. 
 
Nevertheless, a key activity of the PSA is the conduct by its employees of audits 
and actual verification, in other words taking a direct look into the field.
28
 This safety 
control method had also been used traditionally, before the existence of internal control 
within the industry. This action entails a possibility for the employees of the PSA to check 
‘with their own eyes’ all kinds of compliance e.g. the strength of the cranes’ structure, the 
quality and maintenance of the drills or the high-tech communication equipment. All these 
activities play a significant role for safety because non-compliance with these can have 
direct hazardous results. In this way the PSA can identify how the safety operations are 
being conducted and how direct and efficient the emergency response can be. But of 
course, as mentioned before, having over 75 fixed installations and 40 mobile units on the 
NCS under its control, this direct monitoring can mainly be sampling.   
 
To conclude, the state safety control is being conducted both by verification and 
supervision. However, since the basic element of offshore safety is the internal control 
system, supervision gains more weight for the entire task of the Authority. The basic 
conviction is that the government cannot ‘inject’ quality into an industry – this has to come 
from the industry itself in order for safety to be as efficient as possible. This is also a 
reason why the PSA has a relatively low number of 170 employees– since its work mainly 
constitutes of advisory-supervisory character and not of so extensive ‘on the spot’ checks. 
 
The question that remains is what happens if although the clear safety norms, the 
frequent supervision and the individual decisions, the industry is not complying with them. 
Then the authorities have the power to enforce the necessary requirements by issuing 
various kinds of sanctions.  
 
The general provision for possible sanctions is found in section 72 of the 
Framework Regulations: ‘Provisions with regard to penalties and other sanctions […] 
                                                 
28
 An offshore audit comprises many different activities – in-depth reviews as well as formulating the overall 
picture. 
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apply to violation of requirements stipulated in and pursuant to these regulations’. One 
should look into the Petroleum Act which is widely applicable and helps a bit more in that 
respect. So, section 10-13 of the Petroleum Act describes the revocation of the license in 
case of ‘serious or repeated violations’. In other words, a license granted for exploration 
and production can be revoked if the licensee breaches seriously a safety regulation (even 
once) or if he continuously violates a safety standard. It should, however, be noted that this 
provision has never been used in practice. Apart from this, section 10-16 of the Petroleum 
Act is also relevant, stipulating ‘warning’ fines as enforcement measures: a daily fine can 
be imposed until the responsible party conforms to the authorities’ decisions. Suspension 
of the petroleum activities is also possible if violation continues, as a means of exercising 
pressure to the operator to comply as quickly as possible.
29
 As a last measure penal 
provisions are called upon willful or negligent violation of the safety provisions.
30
 
However, in practice these sanctions are rarely used. Issues related to safety are solved 
through dialogue between the PSA and operators, through which the operators normally 
must fulfill certain conditions set by the PSA. 
 
Summing up, state safety management is composed by safety norms that have to be 
met and a system which audits if these norms are met. So the state safety management 
consists of both legislation and supervision to ensure that the industry
31
 itself will make the 
correct choices.  By its turn, this safety control is performed primarily by the industry 
itself, through verifications under the internal control system, for all the reasons mentioned 
above. Therefore, the safety management is conducted both by the State and the industry: 
the State lays down the necessary rules and supervises their efficiency, whereas the 
industry is obliged to acquire responsibility by establishing an internal control system and 
carry out verifications according to it. These two major players in the oil and gas arena 
form the concept of safety management which ensures the high level of safety in petroleum 
activities. 
Therefore, it is also very important to have an insight into how the industry performs its 
safety management. 
 
                                                 
29
 Section 10-16 of the PA, 3
rd
 subsection. 
30
 Section 10-17 of the PA describing imprisonment as penal provision. 
31
 Emphasis added. 
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3.3 Industry safety management 
 
3.3.1 Internal control 
As mentioned before, the state issues goal-setting rules on safety in the petroleum 
activities and monitors their application by the licensees. The safety control as such is 
carried out by the industry itself, through the internal control system: the operator has to 
implement measures according to the regulations and generally adopt an efficient system 
for certification of the correct application of all the safety requirements in his petroleum 
activities. 
 
The general obligation for the internal control system stems from section 10-6 of 
the Petroleum Act which stipulates the duty of the responsible party to comply with the 
regulations ‘through the implementation of necessary systematic measures’. In other 
words, it is not enough to follow the direct or indirect safety norms found in the legislation. 
In addition to this and more importantly, the operator/licensee shall see to it that everyone 
carrying out work for him is complying with the safety regulations. This means that the 
operator bears two closely-connected duties: i) a high active duty to ensure that the 
activities are being operated safely and additionally ii) a follow-up duty to see that others 
performing work for him follow the regulations too. The importance of this follow-up duty 
becomes obvious since it is clearly mentioned in both the PA and the Framework 
Regulations.
32
 
 
It goes without saying that the so clearly expressed see-to-it duty applies 
throughout the petroleum operations; it is in other words a fundamental obligation coming 
into existence from day one and lasts till the end of the activities. Basically, the operator is 
defined as the responsible party
33
 and therefore responsible for a daily duty to manage 
successfully the petroleum activities. Needless to say, the licensee and contractors and sub-
                                                 
32
 Second subsection of section 10-6 of the PA and section 7 of the Framework Regulations. 
33
 Section 6 letter a) of the Framework Regulations. 
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contractors retain the obligation to also see to it that all applicable safety requirements are 
complied with.
34
 
 
The internal control system expresses the culture that has dominated for a long time 
in the Norwegian offshore industry. It is primarily the individual player’s duty to comply 
with the regulations. The operator should for this goal establish a management system with 
all the necessary partners, teams of experts, risk analyzers etc. and follow-up continuously 
that the participants of the activities comply with the requirements.  
 
The internal control shall ensure that all measures concerning safety will be dealt 
with a coordinated manner, in a systematic and planned way. The industry itself will define 
how it will correct failures or further develop successful practices. The PSA has made it 
clear that weight is given to the executive management of the operator of the production 
license because he possesses an overview of the operations; he knows the weaknesses and 
what to do to cure them. Through this entire plan, the safety regulations and the authorities 
will be at his side showing the desirable way. 
 
It is also crucial to mention the importance of the individual responsibility of all 
people involved in petroleum activities – from the subcontractor to the employee working 
on the platforms. The success of the internal safety control system is based not only on its 
central management, but also on the special experience and knowledge of the people 
performing the actual work. Of course it is not only the operator or licensee that 
contributes to the safety. Since there are plenty of people involved in the industry, all have 
to do everything possible to ensure safety. The employers must ensure a safe and 
productive working environment and their employees shall contribute within their tasks 
following word by word the instructions.
35
 
 
Moreover, it is very important that all players of petroleum activities work closely 
together in order to achieve the desirable safety result. In Norway, the ‘tripartite’ 
collaboration between companies, workers’ unions and the government has been long 
                                                 
34
 See the Guidelines regarding the Framework Regulations about section 7, explaining in detail the various 
responsible parties and their duties. 
35
 Section 2-3 of the Working Environment Act and section 7, 4th subsection of the Framework Regulations. 
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established and contributes to the overall safety. It is normal however to face different 
challenges when various interests are involved, but Norwegian working life has achieved a 
satisfactory level of partnership among these parties. Consequently, each one adds his 
knowledge from a different aspect of the industry. 
 
3.3.2 Connection with state safety management 
In the above analysis, it has been made clear that the players obtaining the desired 
safety level in the offshore activities are two: the state and the industry. The concept of the 
safety management contains two basic directions: firstly the existence of the safety norms 
(in the form of objective-setting regulations) and secondly the establishment of a system 
that these rules are complied with. As far as the two players are concerned, each one 
exercises its task differently but with interlinked results. 
 
Seeing it closer, the state lays down the norms which it thinks necessary for safety. 
Then, it checks that these rules are followed by carrying out supervisions or issuing 
individual decisions when special circumstances so require. But most importantly the state 
gives to the industry the freedom to decide how the safety standards shall be achieved. This 
brings us to the internal safety control carried out by the industry itself, a planned and 
systematic management which exists internally, to check compliance. During this process 
the safety requirements lead the way. The industry takes into account all updates, reports 
submitted by other contractors which are all made public by the PSA and makes the 
appropriate choices to correct deficiencies. 
 
Therefore, it is evident that the relationship between state and industry safety 
management resembles a circle: the state lays down regulations – it checks through various 
activities compliance of the industry - the industry implements a system that by itself 
checks if the rules are followed – this internal control is by its turn subject to verification 
by the state.  
 
Although it may seem complex, things look easier upon concentration on two 
parameters: the combination of state and industry in installing safety and the major 
importance of the internal control system. In this way, the industry bears responsibility and 
is obliged to create a well-structured safety system. It is obvious therefore that the 
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Norwegian offshore safety has been built step by step, through thorough consideration of 
how the best safety results can be achieved. 
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4 The British offshore safety system 
 
4.1 Introduction – the Piper Alpha accident 
Undoubtedly, UK is another leader in the European offshore industry, having 
established through the years a well-functioning safety regime. Together with Norway, 
they have created a safety practice which serves as a model for the whole European area. 
This is the reason it has been considered appropriate and useful to refer briefly to the 
British offshore safety system. A description like this will enable a productive comparison 
between the most successful offshore safety regimes in Europe and will give a better 
understanding of why the two countries oppose to unified European rules about safety 
offshore. 
 
The development of the offshore safety rules in the UK differs from that of Norway. 
Unfortunately, it is the case that changes and evaluations of safety regimes take place after 
fatal accidents happen. This was also the case in UK, after the Piper Alpha disaster. To be 
more accurate, one could claim that the offshore safety system could be divided in two 
phases: pre- and post the Piper Alpha disaster. 
 
In July 1988, a series of explosions took place in the Piper Alpha production 
platform situated in the North Sea, causing the death of 167 men. It was the worst disaster 
the offshore petroleum industry had ever experienced, both in the UK oil production 
industry and globally. This accident was the starting point for the British offshore industry 
to review its established safety regime for offshore petroleum operations.  After the shock, 
a public inquiry into the incident was ordered, which was carried out by Lord Cullen. The 
report went through all the details of the accident and revealed quite a lot of inaccuracies 
and unsafe practices that had taken place. 
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Until then, there was a prescriptive
36
  regulatory regime dominating in the industry, 
in the sense that there were specific requirements that needed to be followed. This was also 
the case in the early years of the Norwegian offshore system.
37
 More precisely, in UK there 
were safety norms needed to be followed and the public authorities were provided with a 
checklist in order to see if there is compliance with the regulations. That was a rather stiff 
system, where participation of the industry control by itself was excluded. 
 
The report from Lord Cullen published in 1990 went towards two main directions: 
‘What were the causes of the disaster and what should be recommended with a view to the 
preservation of life and the avoidance of similar accidents in the future?’38.  The report 
revealed several causes of the accident such as technical problems, bad maintenance of 
some parts that should been repaired and mostly problems in the communication system. 
 
Lord Cullen proceeded in a detailed recommendations’ program which basically 
reviewed the whole British safety system of the industry till then. Actually 106 
recommendations were made towards the direction of updating the management system 
regarding safety. More specifically, this report introduced a more ‘open-ended’ scrutiny of 
the installation in the form of a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA): for all offshore 
installations every company has to produce an FSA to assure that its operations are safe.
39
 
Of course it may take time to execute such a program, but its efficiency had not been 
doubted.
40
 
 
The most important development has been the introduction of the so-called 
objective-setting legislation, which was very welcomed by the operators because it 
provided them with more flexibility in the course of compliance. Additionally, the most 
important suggestions driven out from the Cullen report were the high education and 
training of personnel, as well as of the onshore management at all levels. Also the 
importance of the human factor and of communications in order to have a better safety 
regime was highlighted. In particular, it was discovered that the Piper Alpha disaster 
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 Emphasis added. 
37
 See above 3.3.1 about the development of safety regulations. 
38
 ‘The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster’ (Cullen Report 1990),  para.1.1. 
39
 Similar to the documentation duty in the Norwegian safety legislation. 
40
 See R. Cox, M.Walter ‘Offshore safety & reliability’, p.10. 
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resulted more from inadequate communication than from defective technical equipment. 
Therefore, effective communications among the various teams during the drilling 
operations (drilling team, production team, and onshore team) as well as knowledge of the 
works/responsibilities of each one are fundamental for safety. 
 
4.2  Contemporary regime – comparison with the Norwegian safety system 
Nowadays, the applicable legislation for the offshore oil activities in the UK 
includes the Petroleum Act of 1998 which regulates similar issues with these in the 
Norwegian Petroleum Act 1996 and the Petroleum Licensing Regulations 2008 describing 
the conditions for granting a license. 
 
 After the disaster in Piper Alpha the road towards a more goal-setting approach of 
the new regime which encourages the initiative in self-regulation was opened in UK. 
Nowadays, the individual operators rather than the regulator have to constantly ensure that 
all risks are reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable. According to surveys, this 
new management system is considered to be very beneficial to most operators; they have 
acquired a better understanding of the risk that is involved and therefore they can be more 
efficient in safety terms. Generally it has been publicly accepted that the most significant 
changes brought in the British offshore safety system after the Piper Alpha disaster were 
made not in the technical sector but in the management procedures which therefore 
enabled the development of safety in the industry. 
 
For the time being it looks more important than ever to look towards a more 
holistic approach to safety assurance, meaning not only more formal safety requirements 
but also greater public visibility. Design and assessment methods are crucial since the first 
phases of offshore activities are crucial in order to ensure efficient safety. 
 
The responsible public bodies, the Petroleum Engineering Division (PED) together 
with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) kept on pointing that the government cannot 
have direct legal responsibility for offshore safety, it rather enforces the network and seeks 
by guidance to assist those responsible. For a long time the regulators limited themselves 
to a mere prescription of rules. And still, this prescription was not a result of risk 
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assessment or adequate inspection. As a consequence, the industry was more focused on 
the cost-reduction and could not see the problems or the reality which needed an efficient 
safety management.  
 
Until now, it has been quite clear that the two major European offshore systems 
(Norwegian-British) have many similarities. The development may have been different and 
differences still exist: the British offshore safety system contains until today more do’s and 
don’ts than the Norwegian that has fully implemented the internal control from the 
industry. On the other hand, the workers’ unions in Norway have extended rights and 
power into the industry, which is not so much the case in the UK. However, the most 
important remark is that in both countries a system of goal-setting regulations has been 
established. The state cannot have always an eye on the operations; therefore the 
description of safety objectives is of high significance. 
The analysis of the two leading offshore regimes in petroleum operations is 
followed by the description of the upcoming European Regulation (or Directive) which 
attempts to regulate offshore safety in such activities in Europe. 
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5 Proposal of the European Regulation
41
 
  
5.1 Background 
In April 2010 a disastrous accident took place in the Gulf of Mexico after the 
explosion of the Deepwater Horizon which was drilling for BP. The consequences were 
fatal in every aspect: 11 men were killed, 17 injured and during three months the oil was 
flowing unstoppably, releasing 4.9 million barrels of crude oil into the sea. BP was called 
to pay $20 billion to the victims who were raising thousands of claims daily. Needless to 
say, the environmental damage on the marine habitats, the sea and coast life in a line of 
hundreds of miles was very extensive. 
 
This accident was the largest accidental oil spill in the history of the petroleum 
industry and raised extensive awareness from all of its involved parties worldwide. The 
report that followed the accident revealed a seriously defective safety system due to the 
cost-cutting attempts BP was making at the time. This was highly criticized and brought to 
surface the dangers of such a policy: the loss of human lives, the environmental 
catastrophe and the huge compensation costs afterwards. Therefore it became more evident 
than ever in the petroleum industry that a high level of offshore safety has to be maintained 
in places where it is already established, or introduced in countries where it is not so well-
developed. 
 
The European Commission became especially concerned about safety matters in the 
offshore petroleum activities conducted in the European countries. In Europe oil and gas 
operations are mainly and traditionally carried out in the North by Norway, UK the 
                                                 
41
 According to the draft of October 2011, this is a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on ‘safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities’. The 
latest draft of September 2012 refers to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
‘safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC (hereafter: the Proposal). 
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Netherlands and Denmark. But lately other countries in other regions of Europe are 
planning to begin oil and gas exploration and production, such as Malta, Cyprus and 
Greece or countries around the Black Sea. Of course for these countries the petroleum 
operations will be a completely new activity with all the risks entailed by starting a new 
business. Another factor that is adding concerns in the European Commission is the 
geography of Europe itself: many of its waters are closed, not having easy access to the 
open ocean and therefore a petroleum accident could immediately and extensively destroy 
sea and coast. A similar Deepwater Horizon disaster in Europe would actually have 
enormous consequences on marine life, the environment, tourism and so on. 
 
So, the accident in the Gulf of Mexico revealed the extent of consequences that a 
possible disaster could have in the European area and constituted a motive for the 
Commission to take action and to ensure a high level of safety in offshore petroleum 
activities in Europe.  Of course the countries in the region of North Europe could serve as a 
valuable example for safety in offshore oil and gas activities: they have been successfully 
producing oil and gas for decades and have over time developed a high level of safety, so 
their experience is undeniable; one could therefore claim that they can themselves regulate 
safety, without the European guidance. But there is always room for improvement, let 
alone the necessity for sharing of information from the part of these ‘leading’, in terms of 
offshore safety, countries.  
On the other hand, the upcoming oil and gas operations in European countries which 
are totally inexperienced about the field, in conjunction with the disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico made it clear that action from a central body inside Europe should be taken: safety 
requirements are urgent and have to be applied extensively in all Europe. 
 
5.2 Intended goal 
For all the reasons described above, the Commission and the European Council 
proposed a new piece of legislation ‘which will ensure that European offshore oil and gas 
production will respect the world’s highest safety, health and environment standards 
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everywhere in the EU’.42 In other words, the European Bodies decided to create a 
mandatory piece of legislation with a view of ensuring high levels of safety in offshore 
petroleum operations in order to avoid major accidents from happening. It will be 
applicable throughout the whole European area. 
 
Initially, the Commission intended to create a Regulation in order to be immediately 
incorporated into the legislation of each Member State. However, some involved parties 
(countries, industry) claimed that it may be better to introduce a Directive and leave the 
methods of implementation to the Member State. This discussion followed the reaction 
raised primarily from the UK that a Directive would more efficiently meet the necessary 
requirements.
43
 Until this moment, it is not sure what kind of form this legislation will 
have – Regulation or Directive. The majority of the European Council though has been in 
favor of a Directive format. 
 
The petroleum operations are characterized by complexity and high pollution risks. 
These two substantial elements go to the root of the emergence of this regulatory attempt 
of the European Union. Additionally, some risk management practices related to these 
activities have been proved inadequate even in the traditionally oil-producing countries. 
Since most of the oil and gas operations in Europe are conducted offshore, it is considered 
to be more and more urgent to establish a set of regulations about offshore safety. 
 
Clearly, the Member States engaged in such operations follow a variety of rules 
concerning safety. The national regulatory systems present a number of differences, 
something that creates barriers in the productive comparison of the successful regimes in 
order to continuously ameliorate them. Also most of the industries involved might present 
at some point a kind of defect, although they operate in first-class safety systems. 
Generally it is considered by the European Commission that the risk for occurring of an 
accident in offshore installations in Europe is quite high. Therefore there is a need to 
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 From the introduction of the Proposal, October 2011. 
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strengthen the existing regulations and re-define centrally the legal framework under which 
these activities will be carried out. The Commission strongly believes that a unified 
regulation inside the European area will eliminate hazards and effectively protect life and 
the environment. 
 
Consequently, it can be said that the main objectives of this Regulation are four: i) 
introduce a major hazard control system applied in the Union waters by using the best 
practices of the industry, ii) implement in all European jurisdictions the best regulatory 
methods, iii) introduce a very efficient emergency response practice in case of accidents 
and iv) update the liability provisions of the Union, making them clearer. By achieving 
these goals, the chances of having a major disastrous incident in oil operations will be 
significantly diminished
44
.  
 
It is important also to note that towards that direction, the Commission set up the 
‘European Union Offshore Oil and Gas Authorities Group’45, composed of the countries’ 
national authorities with the task to discuss, promote and identify the best practices of the 
industry in order to continuously improve offshore safety. Norway has been invited to also 
participate in this group. 
 
The Union recognizes that some Member States can show great experience and use 
advanced technology on their offshore petroleum operations, namely the Commission 
admits that ‘some Member States have offshore regulatory systems considered world-
class’. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that individual – in the sense of national – 
regulation is not enough: high-end offshore safety legislation needs to be guaranteed 
throughout Europe since all regimes ‘have room for improvement’. Distinctive rules, clear 
liability, strong collaboration and exchange of information among the countries have to be 
included in a clear and mandatory set of rules. The Commission also recognizes increasing 
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fears about safety offshore, given the fact that other countries are coming into the ‘oil 
arena’, without previous experience or knowledge. 
Consequently, a need has arisen for a unified regulatory European framework with 
the goal to establish strict controls on the operations, fast and efficient emergency response 
and clear liability of the parties in case an accident nonetheless occurs. So one could say 
that the goals this Regulation intends to achieve are twofold: directly apply in all European 
countries a specific offshore safety system, and long-term (and most importantly) ensure a 
stable safety regime by reducing the risks linked with offshore petroleum activities. In this 
way it is hoped that human life and the –already sensitive- environment in Europe will be 
adequately protected while working on oil and gas production at the same time. 
 
5.3 Content of the Proposal 
At this point it is important to describe the content of the Proposal, emphasize the 
crucial provisions and highlight the issues that raised doubts from the leading countries of 
the industry, namely Norway and the UK. 
 
To begin with, there are also other Regulations or Directives falling into the 
regulatory area of this Proposal. These are described in the explanatory memorandum of 
the Proposal and they are worth mentioning because they constitute together a grid of rules 
applicable on offshore petroleum activities. 
 
 Firstly, it is the Environmental Liability Directive
46
 which regulates liability for 
damages to the environment and serves as a basis for the part of this proposal dealing with 
liability. Secondly, the Environmental Impact Assessment
47
 is relevant, regulating the 
impacts on the environment that certain projects (such as oil activities) may have and their 
assessments. Further, it is the Waste Framework Directive
48
 fully applicable to oil spills 
and therefore highly relevant. Moreover, the Directive for health and safety of workers at 
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 Directive 85/337/EEC with the latest amendment being 2009/31/EC 
48
 2008/98/EC 
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work
49
 is being strengthened at the current Proposal in order to include notification 
schemes and risk assessments to be submitted. The Directive for granting hydrocarbon 
prospection, exploration and production authorizations
50
 is of course the basis for granting 
licenses for oil and gas exploration and production and is being enriched with more 
obligations during the licensing process. Lastly, the Proposal introduces a new system 
about emergency response through the combination of EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the 
Monitoring and Information Centre and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
 
Before the drafting of this Proposal, the Commission went through extensive 
consultations and discussions with a variety of interested parties about the main aspects of 
the intended regulation. The views of the Member States, the industries and the 
experienced operators are of invaluable importance when such a practical piece of 
legislation is being entered into. Moreover, NGOs and specialized companies (for example 
classification societies) were invited to respond to this Proposal. All in all, between March 
and May 2011 the Commission received a total of 64 contributions from interested parties. 
 
Generally speaking, a complete set of obligations for the operators, the Member 
States and the Commission are described. The operator is defined as 1) the operator of a 
production installation or 2) the operator of an exploration well or 3) the operator of a non-
production installation, making one clear definition of this legal person impossible
51
. The 
operator has to submit to the public authorities (‘competent authorities’ in the Proposal) a 
major hazards report (hereafter: MHR)
52
 containing every technical detail about the 
installations together with all risk management plans. The Member States carry the 
primary duty to establish competent authorities to supervise offshore safety and respond 
accordingly in case of accidents. The Commission from its part established the Offshore 
Oil & Gas Authorities Group that was mentioned above in order to better coordinate 
attempts towards improved safety offshore in oil and gas activities. 
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 In the first chapters of the Proposal, the articles describe how the major hazards 
shall be prevented by establishing safe installations and systematic assessments of the 
likelihood of hazardous events to take place. The Proposal also dissociates the exploration 
from the production license: each kind of license may be granted to different licensees. 
This provision initially came to a complete contrast with the Norwegian practice of 
granting one license for both exploration and production and therefore in the latest version 
it was slightly changed. The authorities may grant a production license to the same licensee 
who holds the exploration license, subject to consideration by the competent authorities of 
certain relevant information. 
 
The national competent authorities have general supervisory power over the offshore 
activities.
53
 They are appointed by the Member States, they have to be independent and 
they are equipped with the power to accept MHRs submitted to them by the licensees, 
assess various reports, perform inspections and impose enforcement measures. They can 
also prohibit an operation if it is proved seriously defective. 
 
Especially for the MHR, there are detailed specifications outlining its content, 
whether it is about a production or a non-production installation. Separate annexes describe 
all technical, managerial, environment-related and operational aspects that need to be 
mentioned in the MHR in order for the competent authority to give its acceptance and 
allow further operation of the installation. In short, the MHR must describe all design and 
management systems used by the operator and have to be submitted for acceptance before 
the actual operation starts. 
 
A basic new element that this Proposal introduces is the independent third party 
verification.
54
 This scheme must be established by the operators, described in the MHR 
and will be based on certain criteria. This third party will assure that the specified safety 
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systems, the risk assessments and the hazard control systems are up to date and satisfy the 
minimum desirable safety level. It may have different legal forms (natural or legal person) 
but it must be totally independent from the operator in order to be completely trusted when 
called to verify written statements about the industry. After the verification process is 
completed and published, the operator shall follow the advice provided by the verifier and 
act accordingly. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that the Proposal puts a lot of weight in the exchange of 
information among the Member States and between the States and the Commission.
55
 
Transparency of the activities is also part of the close cooperation among these parties and 
contributes to the better understanding of the safety practices as well as to their further 
improvement. The experienced countries in oil operations should add their expertise to the 
common group of knowledge and guide the less experienced Members. In this way higher 
safety standards will be promoted, protecting health and environment.  
 
Finally, Chapter VII describes the necessary plans for emergency preparedness and 
response, as well as the mandatory cooperation of the States in case of a transboundary 
disastrous event. In the end of the provisions, there are Annexes containing more 
information about reports, various kinds of notifications and requirements for emergency 
preparedness and response. 
 
As a general comment, it is obvious that the Proposal first and foremost intends to 
bring a certain level of safety in offshore petroleum operations in the whole European area 
in order to minimize the risk of accidents offshore. In this way human life and the 
environment will be protected, especially in regions in Europe where there is no previous 
experience related to these operations and therefore the risk of an accident is higher. 
However, the big issue that arises is what kind of regulatory changes this regulation will 
bring to the countries that have long experience in offshore operations, such as Norway 
and UK: how will the implementation of the Regulation affect their national offshore 
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safety regimes? What are the points in this legislation that are considered of doubtful 
efficiency by major participants? It is very interesting to examine some of these views 
because then both ‘sides’ will be understood. 
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6 Skepticism from Norway and the UK 
 
6.1 Arguments of Norway 
To begin with, Norway is not a member of the European Union, but it is a member of 
the European Economic Area (EEA). This agreement allows Norway to participate in the 
EU’s internal market without being a member of the EU, but with the obligation to adopt 
all legislation related to the single internal market. This single market is based on four 
basic freedoms, the free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the EEA 
countries, as well as on the protection of the competition among them. Therefore Norway 
enjoys free trade within the EEA area and accordingly it carries the duty to implement 
legislation related to social policy, consumer protection, environment, company law and 
statistics
56
. In the case of this Proposal, Norway has officially decided that the Proposal is 
not EEA relevant and will therefore not be included in the EEA Agreement, whether in the 
form of a Regulation or a Directive. This is among other reasons because it does not fall 
within the geographical and substantive scope of the EEA agreement and therefore cannot 
be applicable to the NCS.
57
  
 
This however does not mean that Norway will not collaborate closely with the 
Commission during its task to transmit the world-class Norwegian safety regime – as it is 
repeatedly recognized- in the rest of Europe. As a starting point, the Norwegian 
government completely understands the good intentions of the European Commission with 
this Proposal, namely to achieve a high level of safety in offshore petroleum activities in 
all European countries. With the view of new offshore developments coming in other 
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 Horizontal provisions relevant to the four freedoms, Part V of the EEA Agreement. 
57
 According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs during his speech in May 2012 ‘Address to the Storting 
(Parliament) on important EU and EEA matters’, this Regulation about safety is not EEA relevant because it 
falls outside the substantial scope of the EEA Agreement, namely the four freedoms. Only the protection of 
the environment can be considered relevant, but otherwise these areas attempted to be regulated are also 
outside the geographical scope of the Agreement, so Norway is not obliged to follow it. 
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countries in Europe, such as Malta, Cyprus, Greece or countries in the Black Sea, it is 
normal for fears to come up about how these countries will successfully deal with safety in 
offshore oil and gas activities. Norway is always engaged in efforts to improve safety 
offshore and has made clear its intentions to share its expertise with the European partners. 
 
The Commission consulted various parties in the process of formulating the content, 
structure and the general framework of the Regulation in order to ascertain the views in 
various policy fields.  The experienced countries of the industry were of course invited to 
share their knowledge, Norway included. So, Norway had made its views on the matter 
known to the Commission since last year, when the first Proposal was published (October 
2011).  
 
The general view on the Proposal from the Norwegian side is that its implementation 
in Norway would change significantly the already well-established offshore safety regime, 
which has been proved successful to Norway for decades. It is understandable that a piece 
of legislation is needed in Europe for safety in offshore petroleum operations but this 
should be done without affecting or even deteriorating  the already experienced regimes. It 
looks that this Regulation can be helpful for countries that are starting now to engage in 
such activities, but it may cause more troubles than benefits in the North Sea, where a 
stable safety regime has been operated for more than 40 years now.  
 
In more detail, as was mentioned above while describing the Norwegian offshore 
safety system, it is a non-negotiable rule in Norway that the unambiguous responsibility for 
safety in offshore petroleum activities rests with the operator. According to the long 
Norwegian experience on the field, only the continuous and overall duty of the operator of 
a production license to ensure compliance with safety requirements can guarantee a robust 
safety regime in offshore petroleum operations. Of course the operator has to ensure that 
his employees and contractors follow the necessary requirements and have established a 
solid internal safety control system. Accordingly, all kinds of contractors that the operator 
is working with have to be qualified, equipped with the necessary technological knowledge 
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and shall follow the relevant legal requirements. But once again, it is always the operator 
of the production license that bears the clear, overall responsibility of ensuring the pre-
mentioned compliance with all applicable regulations, both during his activities and in the 
activities of people that work for him.  
 
However, the Proposal does not always provide an unambiguous placement of 
responsibility for safety. This responsibility is placed in part by the competent authorities, 
in part by the operator and in addition the term ‘operator’ in the Proposal is not describing 
one but potentially three different legal persons. This ambiguity and consequently 
uncertainty about who is ultimately responsible for safety is something that the Norwegian 
offshore authorities consider dangerous for the offshore petroleum activities. 
 
The basic objection that Norway presents is the division of responsibility introduced 
by this Proposal. The Norwegian government firmly believes that if responsibility is split 
in between various participants, the offshore operations will be subject to higher risks. In 
short, it is not sufficiently safe to have many responsible parties, as it will then be unclear 
who is ultimately responsible for safety. Experience has shown that a high level of safety 
can be obtained when its control is left entirely on the operator of the production license. 
 
Further, Norway abandoned the system of prescriptive legislation in 1985, when it 
was made clear, after accidents that occurred that this manner of regulation was not safe. 
Instead, an approach of goal-setting rules was established together with the internal control 
system, which placed responsibility for safety primarily upon the industry. The EU 
Proposal constitutes another problem in the respect that it is very prescriptive by itself, 
laying down detailed requirements for every aspect of the operations. Consequently, it 
contradicts the fundamental element of the Norwegian philosophy for safety offshore 
regulation, making it hard to accept it. 
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 On the other hand, it is understood that detailed regulations are needed in countries 
with no previous experience in such activities in order to achieve a high level of safety. It 
is always easier to follow specific and detailed rules using the ‘tick-box’ method, 
especially when there is no competence at the authority level to establish alternative, open-
minded procedures. However, this tactic could bring safety in experienced countries some 
steps backwards, a situation which is not acceptable. It makes sense that Norway does not 
wish to come back to the era of traditional prescriptive legislation which was demonstrated 
to be undesirable in Norway; its objectives-driven approach has been successful so far and 
therefore it needs to be maintained. This is the formal position from both national 
authorities and the industry. 
 
Thirdly, there is a strong skepticism from the Norwegian side towards the Major 
Hazards Report which is introduced by the Proposal, and its supposed function. In this 
report the operator is called to describe in every detail the technical standards of the 
installation as well as the management safety system he will be using, subject to the 
‘acceptance’ of the competent authority. Only after the acceptance of the report can the 
operations start.  
 
Norway also requires from the oil companies all these safety specifications described 
in the Annex II about the MHR, but there is no need for them to be formally submitted in 
as specific regard. All information of the industry is available to the authorities in case they 
wish to check up on them, but it is not required that they will be submitted in advance, 
neither have the authorities to ‘accept’ these reports. The procedure introduced in the 
Proposal enables the authorities to monitor all technical and operational details and then 
either accept or reject them; Norway claims that the Proposal therefore transfers too much 
responsibility for safety from the operator to the authorities. As a result, industry’s 
initiatives will have a subsidiary role in safety in offshore oil and gas activities. 
 
The Norwegian authorities’ role is to supervise the activities while the overall 
responsibility for safety rests entirely with the operator. This further ensures that the 
  
41 
  
operator has to conduct the necessary risk analyses and obtain the desired level of safety. 
Therefore Norway cannot accept that the competent authorities will be obliged to assess all 
technical, economic and risk specifications included in the MHR and then formally accept 
them, because this will immediately mean that responsibility for safety will be transferred 
to the authorities – and this is not safe. 
 
Moreover, the independent verification scheme described in article 15 of the 
Proposal is discouraged by Norway because it questions again the degree of the industry’s 
responsibility. Although in the latest version of the Proposal
58
 it is emphasized that ‘the 
results of the independent verification shall be without prejudice to the responsibility of the 
operator for the correct and safe functioning of the equipment and systems under 
verification’, the wording of the subsequent provisions creates confusion. The operation of 
this scheme places great responsibility on the independent verifier as well as on the 
authorities. As a result, all systems used in the installation will be assessed by the verifier 
and then re-assessed by the competent authorities. Consequently, the operator’s overall 
responsibility and the motive for doing his best in order to continuously improve safety are 
being reduced. 
 
Going further, the Proposal introduces the concept of internal and external 
emergency control. Internal plans are to be proposed by the operator, while external plans 
are the responsibility of the authorities. The internal and external emergency response 
plans and preparedness create concerns about who will be the responsible party. In 
Norwegian offshore oil and gas activities it is always the operator who is responsible for 
emergency planning and control, in the sense of establishment of an efficient response 
regime in case of accidents. The national public authorities will monitor that the operator is 
using all necessary equipment to eliminate the risk of a hazard and handle it appropriately 
if it nevertheless occurs.  The operator is also strictly liable in case of an accident and 
totally responsible for cleaning up operations in case of pollution. 
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 Version from 21 September 2012 
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 In the Proposal however the Member States through the competent authorities seem 
to be given extensive responsibility especially in case of handling an accident.
59
 This 
approach transfers responsibility from the operator to the governmental authorities, 
discouraging in this way the operator from doing his best to prevent accidents, since others 
will also have the responsibility for that. In any case, this unclear placement of 
responsibility creates inconsistencies that cannot obtain the safety level that the 
Commission aims with this Proposal. 
 
Apart from that, in Norway it is a rule that the same licensee will be granted an 
exploration and a production license, since it is normal that the oil companies carrying out 
explorations will also be given the right to produce what they discover. This is in 
accordance with the EU licensing Directive (94/22/EC) but not with this Proposal: in the 
first public draft
60
 it was explicitly stated that authorizations for offshore exploration and 
production were to be granted separately, something that was in complete contrast with the 
Norwegian practice. In the latest version
61
 in article 4 paragraph 3 this strict statement has 
changed but it is still left vague: ‘[...] information collected pursuant to exploration can be 
considered by the Member State prior to production operations being authorized’. It is 
evident that the Proposal contains no further explanations provided about how and by 
whom this information will be assessed and why these two licenses cannot be granted to 
the same oil company. Norway is not willing to incorporate such a practice in its legislative 
system. 
 
Last but not least, Norway criticizes the fact that this Proposal gives great authority 
to the Commission to change the Annexes when considered appropriate. This implies a 
transfer of legislative power to the Commission, which is not acceptable to Norway. Also, 
the economic calculations about the measures and costs of risk reductions are not 
necessarily realistic, since there are many other factors that need to be taken into account. 
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 See Article 30, para 1 ‘Member States shall prepare external emergency response [...]’ and para.4 ‘Member 
States shall take all suitable measures to achieve a high level of compatibility [...] between all Member States 
in a geographical region and further afield where appropriate’. 
60
 Version of 27 October 2011. 
61
 Version of 21 September 2012. 
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To sum up, the points that raise doubts in Norway about this Proposal presented an 
overview of the basic reason of the Norwegian opposition: the responsibility has to stay 
clearly and unambiguously within the industry and not be transferred to the 
public/competent authorities. The ‘heart’ of the Norwegian offshore safety regime, 
established since decades, entails the fundamental element of placement of ultimate 
responsibility for safety upon the operator. It is clear that all the elements described above 
imply a transfer of responsibility from the operator to the authorities. This approach may 
be helpful in geographical areas in Europe that are totally unfamiliar with oil and gas 
operations, but it will seriously and dangerously distort well-established safety regimes 
offshore. In Norway, safety offshore is based on initiatives of the industry and not on ‘dos 
and don’ts’ provided by public bodies. There has been made a huge improvement in this 
respect through experience, qualified personnel and competent companies and there is of 
course no intention to make steps backwards. 
 
6.2 Arguments of the U.K. 
The United Kingdom is together with Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark among 
the leading countries in Europe in offshore petroleum production. Together they produce 
almost 90% of oil and gas in Europe. UK has also, like Norway, built its expertise through 
the years, under unpleasant and harsh circumstances since it was often after an accident 
that higher safety standards were implemented. So, the United Kingdom’s offshore 
industry functions in similar terms with Norway’s and shares basically its view about the 
Proposal. That is, it puts into risk the well-functioning safety regimes in offshore oil and 
gas operations taking place in the North Sea. However, unlike Norway, UK has stated that 
it could compromise with a Directive instead of a Regulation. 
 
Both the British government and the various oil and gas organizations
62
 in the 
country make clear that they intend to always support moves attempted by the European 
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 For example ‘Oil & Gas UK’, the leading representative body for the UK offshore oil and gas industry 
(members are all kind of companies operating in the UK continental shelf). 
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Commission to improve safety standards. However they cannot accept that the UK’s world 
class safety regime in offshore oil and gas operations will be undermined because of the 
Commission’s will to establish a central safety control regime in Europe. The UK will 
definitely oppose the Regulation if this is considered appropriate in order to safeguard its 
safety practices known since decades. This does not mean that the Commission regards the 
offshore activities in the North Sea unsafe – on the contrary, the British side recognizes the 
Commission’s aim to bring the rest of Europe in the safety levels which dominate in North 
Europe. Nonetheless, UK claims that this aim may have the opposite effect on the high 
standard offshore safety regimes. 
 
More specifically, the UK highly doubts the efficient function and the intended aim 
of the MHR. As is the case in Norway too, all these safety requirements required by the 
MHR are present in the British system. Therefore an implementation of the strict, detailed 
MHR will bring confusion to the national authorities, let alone the huge amount of 
administrative procedures that will require a lot of human workforce. It is emphasized by 
the British side that the implementation of safety requirements takes a lot of time – this 
was besides the case after the Cullen report (following the Piper Alpha accident) was 
published: it took almost 7 years for the national authorities and the oil companies to 
implement the recommendations and adjust to the changes introduced by the report. So, the 
estimated time by the Commission needed for adaptation to the rules – 2 years- is not at all 
considered adequate. 
 
Apart from that, the strongest argument against the MHR is that industry attention 
will turn from working to obtain the highest possible safety level to adapting to the 
changes, including rewriting internal safety reports to reach the level required by the 
Commission or restructuring the safety management. As a result, attention of the 
authorities will also be turned away from the actual field of action, the platforms or the 
workers at sea and be canalized to the re-assessment of the reports. This will require both 
people and all types of resources. The national regulator (or the competent authorities) will 
focus on ensuring that the MHR is in compliance with all applicable rules, putting into 
hazard the frontline of the petroleum activities and consequently safety. It is strongly 
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emphasized by the British offshore industry that focus should always remain on people 
because safety is dependent on them. The shift of resources from people to the authorities’ 
offices for a period of time may be catastrophic for the safety of the industry in terms of 
health, safety and environment. 
 
Moreover, the Proposal contains an impact assessment and a cost benefit analysis in 
case of an oil spill accident, in order to justify some provisions. However, the UK does not 
share the Commission’s financial assumptions about various matters because they are 
based on inaccurate and arbitrary data. For example, oil and gas operations in Europe are 
unlikely to cause the same disastrous consequences on the environment as the Deepwater 
Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico, since the wells are much smaller and many of 
them need ‘artificial lift even to flow’63. Therefore the relevant prevention costs are not 
representative, not to mention the high costs that the implementation of this Regulation 
will bring to the Member states instead. According to some reports already carried out, 
these costs outweigh the benefits hoping to be accrued.
64
 Also, the very prescriptive nature 
of the Proposal is criticized, because it brings safety in the North Sea countries some 
decades back, when prescriptive rules were dominating in the industry. This regime 
changed gradually and nowadays the UK also applies the same goal-setting rules system as 
Norway. 
 
Additionally, the unlimited authority of the Commission to change or add safety 
provisions is deemed to contradict the Treaty of Lisbon, which outlines the right of 
countries to manage their own natural resources
65
. UK points out that the oil and gas 
operations require a very high level of knowledge; the mere specification of rules by a 
European body is not enough by itself to ensure safety.  
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 From ‘Oil & Gas UK’ statement about the Proposal published in Aril 2012. 
64
 These reports were conducted by GL industrial services and Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in the 28th March 
and 2nd May 2012. 
65
 Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 13 of December 2007, amending 
the two former Treaties that formed the legal basis of the European Union: the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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Notwithstanding the above, the British authorities made it clear quite from the first 
publishing of the Proposal – and at the moment it is officially requested by them- that a 
Directive in the place of a Regulation would accomplish the intended goals of the 
Commission. This is a ‘counter-offer’ from the British part during the negotiations 
between the Commission and the states; UK claims that a Directive could better ensure 
application of major safety rules in Europe and maintain the leading offshore regimes 
without the load of bureaucracy that a Regulation would cause. 
 
It becomes clear from the above that the UK opposes mainly to the direct 
implementation of the proposed rules, without consulting firstly relevant parties (industry, 
organizations, and authorities) that have direct contact with the offshore business. 
Therefore the basic problem in the UK is the legal form of the Regulation – it would prefer 
a Directive instead. What UK suggests is an informatory course of discussions between the 
advanced Members and the non-experienced countries about the offshore oil and gas 
activities. Given the fact that UK is willing to share valuable information regarding 
offshore safety and encourage inexperienced countries to follow the appropriate safety 
practices, it may contribute to the formulation of a proper Directive. According to the 
British view, in this way the countries that start now to carry out oil and gas operations will 
be able to smoothly incorporate the European requirements into their existing legislation, 
while the experienced countries will protect their existing regimes. 
 
Moreover, other parties involved in the UK offshore industry supported the view that 
the current Proposal weakens the UK safety regime and puts at risk its high standards. Oil 
and gas workforce and industry represented by organizations such as Unite, RMT and Oil 
& Gas UK
66
 claimed that the current UK offshore safety culture will be jeopardized by the 
central control of the European Union. Besides, the content of the Commission’s Proposal 
will provide only slight benefits on the existing UK safety regime and on the rest of its 
neighboring countries: 90% of all European oil and gas production accounts for the 
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 ‘Joint UK Industry and Trade Union Position Paper’ published in 18 April 2012. 
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countries in North Europe, leaving only 10% into the regulatory scope of this Proposal, 
since its main goal is to regulate offshore oil activities in the non-experienced countries of 
such business. 
 
The British Trade Unions put an emphasis also on the burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures that will be caused by the implementation of these rules, changing completely 
the already established regime. It is highly possible that through this procedure attention 
and resources will be taken, even temporarily, from the frontline activities is, thereby 
posing a significant risk to safety. Apart from that, the Trade Unions in the UK react to the 
Commission’s indifference towards the Workers’ Associations and the industry’s 
representatives. It seems that the Proposal focuses only on prescribing regulations and does 
not intend to substantially listen to views from these parties; their decisive role in 
improving safety offshore is disregarded from the Commission. However, it is an 
established practice in UK (as well as in Norway with the so-called ‘tripartite 
collaboration’) that the regulator, employees on the platforms and public authorities 
collaborate closely and contribute together to high-end safety. Therefore an important 
account of these groups should be taken in order for a well-functioning safety regime to be 
established in Europe, as has been the case in the UK continental shelf. 
 
Finally, it is obvious that UK Trade Unions and the industry oppose the extensive 
control power given with this Proposal to the Commission. Its application will dominate 
over national legislation (if it will come out with a form of a Regulation) and the 
Commission will have the authority to amend sections of the Regulation when considered 
necessary with the potential of introducing new ones. This high authoritative control will 
result in predominance of the Commission and to the substitution of the Member States’ 
authorities by a centralized control. But this approach will crucially harm the well-
functioning regimes in the sense that their operators, authorities and regulators are much 
more competent in the business than any other European body. Therefore, this shift of 
control from the States to the Union is highly undesirable from the British side. 
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Most importantly, UK sees in the form of a Directive a friendlier approach to the 
traditional and more experienced safety regimes. According to this opinion, only in this 
way will the high-class offshore safety regimes in North Europe stay intact. At the same 
time, the weaker Members will have the opportunity to start oil and gas explorations with a 
solid regulatory framework for the protection of health and environment.
67
 
 
6.3 Summary 
Some very important results can be derived from the above description of Norway’s 
and the UK’s positions against the Proposal. First of all, both countries are willing to 
contribute with their expertise and competency to a widespread application of offshore 
safety rules for petroleum activities in the whole Europe. The complexity and the nature of 
the oil and gas operations offshore demand a comprehensive, stable safety regime that will 
protect people and the environment. In this way more Member States and the European 
Union will be able to benefit from the great economic flow of the petroleum activities 
without harming people or nature. 
 
On the other hand, an offshore accident in the European waters would have fatal 
consequences in every direction. The danger is not likely to come from the installations of 
North Europe since the safety regimes established there are highly competent, stable and 
efficient. But since new Member States are starting to be engaged in offshore oil and gas 
operations, it is prudent for the European Union to seek to introduce a detailed piece of 
legislation. This is a way to lay down the minimum requirements that have to be followed 
by all Members engaged into offshore oil and gas activities. 
 
However, this attempt from the Commission to establish a unified regulatory 
framework in order to achieve high safety standards offshore is not considered successful, 
at least by the two leading countries of the industry. The most experienced actors of the 
field, Norway and UK, seriously doubt a regime where safety offshore will be controlled 
centrally by European authorities whose competence and knowledge is being questioned. 
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 See the written statement of the UK Parliament in 13 June 2012 about ‘EU: Energy Council’. 
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Their fears have to do basically with the transfer of responsibility from the industry, the 
authorities and from the national regulators to European authorities. This attempted 
centralized control is undesirable because –as these countries claim- it endangers the well-
functioning regimes of the North Sea. In other words the North Sea countries seem to say 
‘we are already competent to safely conducting oil and gas activities offshore, so there is 
no need for us to follow a legislation that will change our practices in a detrimental 
manner’. 
 
However, there is a significant difference in the positions towards the Proposal 
between Norway and UK. In addition to the objections about the changes attempted, 
Norway believes the Proposal does not fall into the regulatory scope of the EEA 
Agreement of which it is member. Therefore it has concluded that this Proposal will not 
become a part of its national legislation even if it comes out in the form of the Directive. 
Having weighted the advantages and disadvantages, Norwegian authorities and industry 
believe that the implementation of such legislation will be detrimental rather than 
beneficial for the safety offshore. 
From the other side, UK strongly supports that the Proposal takes the form of a 
Directive. In order to deeply comprehend the British argument, it is important to outline 
the differences between the two regulatory forms.  
 
The legal basis for the exercise of the Union’s competences is article 288 of the 
Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which describes the forms that 
the legislative texts of the European Union can take. A Regulation is self-executing; it 
becomes directly part of the Member States’ legislation without the need of 
implementation procedures or measures. Therefore it is absolutely binding in its entirety 
and has general application throughout the Union.  
 
On the other hand, a Directive requires from the Member States to achieve a 
particular result without prescribing the means of reaching it. Each State will specify the 
methods that are considered appropriate towards the goal given by the Commission. So the 
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Directive is binding as to the result that needs to be achieved, but it leaves to the national 
authorities to choose the form and methods. The Member States are provided with a 
timetable to implement the intended result of the Directive, within which they mainly 
adopt their laws to the requirements of the Directive. 
 
The above description helps to better understand why UK supports the Directive-
alternative. It will allow UK a smoother transition into the introduced changes by the 
Union, since the required level of safety will be achieved through means determined by the 
Member State. This will provide the authorities with a certain degree of freedom to adapt 
to the European requirements. This is the best way, according to UK, to maintain its world-
class safety regime; simultaneously, an important piece of legislation will be entered into 
in order to guide safe oil and gas operations offshore in other areas of Europe. A 
Regulation would cause difficulties for the British authorities because they would be 
obliged to rewrite their laws in order to bring them in line with the Commission’s will.  
 
It is obvious that whether it results in a Regulation or a Directive, this Proposal has 
created a lot of discussions about its intended goal and efficiency. In particular, the 
opposition from two major oil-producing countries constitutes a good reason to go into a 
critical view of the issue. 
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7 Critical discussion 
 
7.1 Unified offshore safety in Europe 
Under International Law it is a fundamental right of every State to exploit the 
natural resources that are placed in its soil as well as in its Continental Shelf. Several 
international Conventions have guaranteed this right, acknowledging the importance that 
the exploitation of the natural wealth has for the society and the national economy. 
According to the United Nations Convention of the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS) ‘the 
coastal State exercise over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources’ and ‘no-one may undertake these 
activities without the express consent of the coastal State’. For this purpose similar rights 
are granted for the establishment of sub-marine installations and drilling on the continental 
shelf.
68
 
 
Taking this unambiguous right a step further, it is evident that the EU’s energy 
policy is coherent with the international practices and on the top of it its aim is to 
‘organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the 
Member States’.69 The founding Treaty of the European Union (signed in 1992 at 
Maastricht) was significant among other reasons because it listed measures that needed to 
be taken for energy practices and infrastructure. Additionally, it strengthened the legal 
basis for environmental protection in Europe. The TFEU went into deeper detail about the 
policies of the European Union, among which is public health, environmental and energy 
policy. However, it was only in the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2007 that a European energy 
policy was officially approved, introducing solidarity in energy matters. In practice 
nevertheless, energy policies remain part of the authoritative control at a national state 
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 UNCLOS was concluded in 1982 with all EU countries and Norway being parties of the Agreement. It 
regulates all ocean space with the rights and responsibilities in their use and defines the judicial nature and 
outer limits of the continental shelf. The rights mentioned here are regulated in articles 77, 79 and 81.  
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 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Title I, article 1. 
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level and only voluntarily cooperate the States at a European level. In other words, there is 
no mandatory, in terms of enforcement or penalties, close collaboration between the States 
and the Union in the field of upstream oil and gas. 
 
For this reason the Union has provided the energy sector in Europe with great 
independence of action. Of course the European legislation is based upon the fundamental 
policies of the free internal market and the protection of the environment during the 
various energy operations that need by all means to be obtained. However, there has been a 
certain degree of initiative-taking and independent operations within this legal framework 
in the offshore petroleum operations. Either because of the recognized –by the EU- 
competence and experience of the petroleum sector in certain parts in Europe or because 
the involved industries did not wish interference by a European institution, this was the 
framework into which these activities had been conducted for years. 
 
Consequently, some States as well as private parties may regard this Proposal as a 
threat to their long-standing offshore regimes. The situation becomes a bit complicated 
because on the one part these countries are willing to share their competency in offshore 
oil and gas activities throughout Europe, but on the other hand they wish to keep their own 
policies intact. It is also normal that especially now, as offshore petroleum activities in 
Europe are expanding, the European Union as a central regulatory institution aims to 
establish a high safety level for people and the environment throughout Europe.  
 
It is obvious therefore that the reasons that have created debate about this Proposal 
are political, legal and economic. The States that react want to keep their regulatory 
autonomy in offshore safety matters that are considered to be the best in the world. 
However, many claim that ‘if this perception of reality prevails, it will only increase the 
risk of accidents’70. Apart from that, Norway does not wish a Brussels’s interference in a 
field where its experience is much longer than the existence of the EU itself and could even 
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 From the speech of Frederic Hauge, Bellona President, before ONS annual conference in 2010, Stavanger, 
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lead to a reduced level of safety. Alternatively, as a non-EU Member Norway invokes that 
the attempted regulation does not fall into the EEA scope, therefore it cannot be binding to 
the EEA States. At this point there is an obvious disagreement, since in the Proposal it is 
written that the text has EEA relevance.
71
 
 
On the other side, the UK disagrees with the shift of the regulatory offshore control 
from the Member States to the Commission. As an EU Member it tries to find the best 
legal and political solution in order to safeguard its regime: a Directive has a legal basis 
within the EU and can satisfy the Commission’s will to establish common safety standards 
across Europe. Most importantly for the UK, a Directive will actually bring no changes to 
the British offshore safety regime, since the goals prescribed can be achieved through the 
already existing system.    
  
The Commission is therefore called on to take many aspects into consideration in 
order to successfully fulfill its goal. Geographic conditions, previous experience and 
knowledge and scientific expertise are only some of the factors that determine the safety in 
offshore petroleum activities. It is difficult to establish one regime for offshore oil and gas 
operations in an area which presents so many inequalities in all the above sections. 
Political and economic differences split the Mediterranean and the Black Sea countries 
from the ones in North Europe. Therefore the same legislation most probably cannot be 
applied in a business that requires so sensitive management.   
 
The question that remains, though, is to what extent the goal of this Proposal is 
achievable. Can Europe establish a unified offshore safety regime? What factors need to be 
taken into account? Has the Commission weighted all possible negative effects? How 
could it harmonize the need for preventing tragedies in offshore Europe with the interests 
of the North Sea countries? All these are difficult questions that cannot be easily answered.  
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7.2 Future challenges   
The point is that protection of life and environment falls within the Union’s 
primary functions; nobody can demand that European Institutions stay unconcerned about 
the dangers that offshore petroleum activities entail. There is no meaning in examining 
why the Union decides to regulate centrally safety offshore just now – undeniably, 
accidents that happen somewhere in the world constitute motives for re-assessment and re-
structuring of regulations. It is vital to consider though that the well-established offshore 
safety regimes must be maintained and promoted to other places in Europe that do not have 
such political stability or economic and technological capacity as the North Sea countries. 
 
From their side, the North Sea neighboring countries should collaborate closely 
with the Union and share their knowledge and offshore safety practices. As was analyzed 
above, there is definitely such intention from Norway and the UK; the objection of both 
countries towards this Proposal has not to do with them being arrogant or isolated from the 
less competent States in the field –they simply trust their regulators and industries that 
have been operated in the area for a long time and they wish to keep their regimes within 
their national sovereignty. As stiff as their position may sound, their will to safeguard what 
has been hard obtained, shall be comprehended.  
 
However, there are other voices in the field who think that there will be no such 
overall control from the Union and that the Member States with their industries are 
exaggerating. The Commission will simply harmonize practices and standards in an 
attempt to bring a high safety level in all European offshore oil and gas activities. It is 
surprising to see how NGOs and specialized companies such as classification societies see 
very positively the need for changes (especially enforcement measures) at a European 
level. Requirements from these parties also include strict prescriptive regulations, stronger 
physical inspections and independent verifications. It is evident that there is a conflict of 
interests between the States/industry and the NGOs or citizens that creates undesirable 
situations among parties of the same business. 
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Therefore, it is requested by both States and the EU to work actively towards the 
common goal, which is the establishment of a high safety level in offshore petroleum 
operations in Europe. Both parties shall try to find a common place for their arguments 
with a direction towards better safety offshore. It seems that the European Commission has 
already taken into consideration the points raised by UK in terms of the format of the 
Proposal. The majority in the European Council is in favor of a Directive, with the 
advantages that such a solution entails. This decision is very encouraging for the 
comprehension and cooperation between States and the EU. 
 
However, the challenges that the Union is called to face still exist. Needless to say, 
the Union comprises various nations with different economic strengths and operations 
generally. The offshore petroleum sector is of high importance and its safety management 
from the Union has to be conducted very carefully. Of course the already successful 
regimes should in no case be put in danger. Additionally, safety is obtained through long-
lasting experience which becomes a whole industry culture. In other words, it is impossible 
to ‘decide’ safety through a piece of legislation. If the national authorities are incompetent 
or if the State is hesitant to take initiatives and encourage internal control from the 
industry, the consequences will be severe. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
 
Offshore petroleum operations are of significant importance for the States that 
exploit their petroleum resources as well as for the European Union, since welfare for the 
economy and the people is ensured. Such activities are strongly encouraged because they 
contribute to the common energy and foreign policy of the Union, an important chapter of 
the TFEU that regulates the Union’s external actions. 
 
The allocation of offshore oil and gas operations in Europe is quite simple: 
Countries in the North Sea produce 90% of the oil and gas in Europe. This has been the 
case for decades, therefore it is only normal that these countries have acquired a great 
degree of experience. Until today, the leading States of the business, Norway and UK, have 
operated quite independently and established national safety regimes in order to protect 
people and the environment. Although accidents have occasionally taken place, the 
offshore safety regime of the North Sea is considered to be nowadays among the best in the 
world. For this reason, these regimes can serve as a template to further promote safety 
offshore. Taking into account the hazardous character of the operations, the European 
Commission has introduced a piece of legislation in order to regulate safety offshore. 
However, the Proposal has raised many objections from the expert countries. 
 
Although the Union is facing far more complicated problems at the moment -
economic, issues of European consistency or even survival- the matter of offshore safety 
shall not be underestimated. An accident in an offshore petroleum installation in the 
European waters would have fatal consequences on human lives, marine environment and 
on the economy in general and thereby also on the licenses to operate on which all oil 
companies depend. Given the present harsh economic circumstances in Europe, fears are 
growing that involved countries will proceed to cost-cutting measures in terms of 
equipment, maintenance, and education of personnel. So it is at this point that a dynamic 
intervention of the Union is requested in order to ensure safe practices offshore. 
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 Of course this should be done without harming the successful regimes. The Union 
is lucky to have in its team highly competent partners; therefore it should listen to their 
views and use them in the best way in order to achieve a high level of safety. The 
arguments of the different parties are understood, but it is necessary that all work together 
positively towards the common aim, which is a safe working and natural environment 
while operating in petroleum production at sea. Economic growth can only be guaranteed 
through safety of people and the environment – that is a challenge that the Union is called 
to face. 
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